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Problematical Background
Ibn Khaldun (732 H71332 AD-808 
H/1406 AD) has differentiated between two 
approaches to Ushûl al-Fiqh. The first is 
the method of Mutakallimun (theologians) 
or Syâfi’is and the other is the method of 
Fuqahâ’ or Hanâfis.1 Under the former 
1 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, ed, Rosenthal (London: 
1958), III, pp, 23-34. In fact, there are three approaches to Ushûl 
al-Fiqh. The third approach, however, is through combination 
of the methods above. See, M. Hashimi Kamali, Prinsip dan 
Teori-teori Hukum Islam, tr. Noorhadi from “Principles of 
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method is like the work of al-Juwaynî, 
al-Burhân, of al-Ghazâli, al-Mustashfâ, of 
Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzi, al-Mahshûl, and the 
work of al-’Amidî, al-’Ihkâm, which is 
annoted to the three works above. Under 
the latter, however, is like the work of 
Abû Hasan al-Karkhi (d. 340 H), Ushûl 
al-Karkhi, of al-Jashshash, Ushûl al-Jashshas, 
of Abû Zayd al-Dabbusi, Ta’sîs al-Nazar, 
Islamic Jurisprudence,” Cambridge: Islamic Text Society, 1991 
(Jogjakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996), p. 11.
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of Fakhr al-Islâm al-Bazdawi, Ushûl al-
Bazdawi, and the work of Shams al-Dîn 
al-Sarakhsyi (490 H), Ushûl al-Sarakhsyi.2
It should be clarified that the 
Mutakalliniun or Syâfi’is’ method has been 
nothing: connected with Syâfi’i himself (204 
H). In other words, Syâfi’i was not first 
person who gave preference to apply this 
method, although he, already well known, 
firstly founded the science of Ushûl al-Fiqh 
in his al-Risâlah. As George Makdisi has 
shown us that Syâfi’i was traditionalist who 
composed al-Risâlah for such ideology to 
prevent the influence of the ahl al-kalam’s 
(theologians’) views into Islamic Law. In 
this context, he referred to Mu’tazilah trend 
which was strongly well established in his 
time based on rationalism. Therefore, as 
Makdisi argues, in discussing Ushûl al-Fiqh 
through his al-Risâlah, Syâfi’i did not deal 
with the matters of both Kalam and legal 
Philosophy but he consistently discussed 
the matters that belong to the positive 
law and its methodology based on Alquran 
and Sunnah.3 He all raised the degree of 
the Prophet’s Sunnah after Alquran, which 
was almost neglected by jurists (mujtahid) 
before him in applying laws.4 We shall see 
the works on Ushûl al-Fiqh of his followers 
mostly diviated from his al-Risâlah.
The Mutakallimun’s method generally 
expresses theoritical doctrines. Most of 
2 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah.
3 George Makdisi, Juridical Theology of Syafi’i-Origins and 
Significance of Ushûl al-Fiqh,” Studia Islamica LIX (1984). p. 16.
4 See, Imâm Mâlik, al-Muwatta’, (Cairo: 1370 ), p. 11.; 
Yâsin Dutton, “Sunna, Hadith, and Madina ‘Amal,” Journal of 
Islamic Studies 4: 1 (1993); 1-31. Imâm Mâlik, before Syâfi’i, 
in most of his legal decisions tended to be more based on the 
practices of the Madinan people than the Prophet’s Sunnah, 
for legal decisions taken by diciples of Abû Hanîfah, who 
were younger generation of Mâlik, Abû Yûsuf in his Kitâb al-
Kharajand Syaibâni in his al-’Asal. See, among others, Baber 
Johensen, Islamic Law and Land Tax(London: the Clarendon 
Press, 1950), pp. 17-23. For Syafi’i`s contribution to Islamic 
legal theory, see, Joseph Schach, The Origins of Muhammadan 
Jurisprudence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959); idem., Islamic 
Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
their doctrines tend to hardly use the 
judgment of practical application of theory 
to furu’ (the branches of law). This can 
be seen, among others, the outlines of 
work on Ushûl al-Fiqh by this method. 
Abû Sulaimân declares that in most cases 
Mutakallimun deductively systimatize their 
doctrines on Ushûl, on the one hand, to 
interprete the legal sources (Alquran and 
Sunnah/Hadith) and the social problems, 
on the other hand, should be deemed to 
those doctrines. The general systimatization 
as follows:
Introduction, which consists of:
1. Explanation about linguistics
2. Syari’ah law 
3. Syari’ah indicants or proves (dalâ’il)
4. The method of legal application 
5. Mujtahid (jurist) and his obligations
A. The division of words based on dalâlah 
al-lafaz (indicants of text) from the 
degree of clarity 
B. Analyzing the words from Mujmal 
(intricate) and Mutasyâbih (enigmatic).
C. Dalâlah al-mafhûm (implied meaning 
derived from contexture).5
GeorseMakdisi and Wael B. Hallaq 
claim that the first independent and 
comprehensive works on Ushûl al-Fiqh 
after al-Risâlahof Syâfi’i were written in 
the first fourth of tenth century, one or 
two centuries after Syâfi’i’s death.6 The 
most works came down to us were written 
from those and following centuries and 
treat the problems of Kalam (theology) and 
5 Abû Sulaimân, al-Fikr al-Ushûli, (Cairo: Dâr al-Shuruq, 
n,d.), p. 448.
6 Wael B. Hallaq, “Was al-Syafi’i the Master Architect of Islamic 
Jurisprudence?,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25:4 
(1993). p. 594.
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Philosophy, which do not properly belong 
to Ushûl al-Fiqh. Among those problems 
are the problems of the determination 
of good and evil, of the qualification of 
acts before the advent of revelation, and 
the problem of the imposition of legal 
obligation on the non-existent.7 Al-Bashri 
in his work, al-Mu’tamad, as Makdisi 
argues, condamns this trend, especially 
after commenting al-’Umad, the work of 
Qâdi ‘Abd al-Jabbâr. He found in it the 
matters of Kalam and Philosophy.8 The 
other example is the work of ‘Izz al-Din 
bin ‘Abd. al-Salam, Qawa’id al-’Ahkâm fî 
Mashâlih al-’Anam. Through his work, ‘Abd 
al-Salam, as Hallaq has shown, presents 
several elements into his work not only 
law proper but also, such as, sufism and 
political concepts.9 In short, the works on 
Ushûl al-Fiqh that mostly came down to 
us cancerns not only with the law proper, 
but also with questions of linguistics, logic, 
methodology, epistemology, and theology. 
Why they deviated from al-Risâlah of 
Syâfi’i, it is not our concern here.
It seems that the complexity of the 
subject leads the modern scholarship 
relatively little has been focussing on Ushûl 
al-Fiqh, and finally comes to conclusion 
that Ushûl al-Fiqhcan not be used with 
profit by jurists or judges in real legal 
problems or in Islamic legal reforms.10 In 
line with this, among others, Louay Safi in 
his book The Foundation of Knowledge, 
after viewing the various methods, from the 
method of textual analysis to the method 
of logical analysis until the science and the 
7 George Makdisi, “Juridical Theology of Syafi’i,” p. 16.
8 George Makdisi, “Juridical Theology of Syafi’i,” p. 15.
9 Wael B. Hallaq, “Ushûl al-Fiqh: Beyond Tradition,” 
Journal of Islamic Studies 3:2 (1992), p. 185.
10 Hallaq has critisized some modern scholars who claim 
that Ushûl al-Fiqh is purely theoritical religious science and 
remains substantly unchanged, see his, “Considerations on the 
Function and Character of Sunni Legal Theory,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, 104:4 (1984), p. 679.
problematic of metaphysical knowledge, 
comes to conclusion, among other things, 
that Muslims’ method, including legal 
method, did not pay adequate attention to 
the development of methods geared towards 
understanding social phenomenon but more 
focused on method of textual analysis and 
systematization of textual inference, rather 
than systematically developed scientific 
methods and procedures.11
The Social Legal Concepts and 
Application of the Fuqaha’s Legal 
Theory
Louay Safi’s conclusion is not entirely true 
since the Fuqaha’s method has not been 
properly consulted, which is, according to 
the writer, more applicable. To prove this, 
the rest of this paper will discuss ‘illah (legal 
cause) as one of the important elements in 
Fuqaha’s legal theory, then will campare it 
with the Mutakallimun’s. 
The Fuqaha’s method approaches 
Islamic law by postulated methological 
principle or opinions given by authoritative 
legal sources (Qawâ’id al-Fiqhiyyah). 
Their theories, therefore, formulated for 
outlining contextual application, tending to 
synthesize between principles and realities 
and trying harder to compromise between 
them.12 This can be seen from the work 
of al-Dabbusi, Ta’sts al-Nazar. Through 
his work he intends to show the distinct 
opinion (ikhtilâf ) among jurists, hoping 
that it can help whom involved in the legal 
investigation and its application (tanâzur), 
by giving methodological principles and 
then followed by rulings that extracted from 
them. As an example of a methodological 
principle is the preferability of a tradition 
11 Louay Safi, The Foundation of Knowledge, (Malaysia: 
International Islamic University Malaysia Press, 1996), p. 118.
12 Kamali, Prinsip danTeori-teori Hukum Islam, p. 10.
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of the Prophet qualified as “ahad”, that is 
transmitted by a relatively small number 
of transmitters to a valid qiyâs (analogy 
or legal deduction).13
The particular method of deduction 
used in both Mutakallimun and Fugaha’ is 
qiyâs. Technically, according to al-Syaukâni, 
qiyâs is legal deduction as a way for 
extending a ruling stated in legal sources 
(nas) to a new case unstated in them, 
for they both share the same ‘illah (legal 
cause).14 Most legal theories (Ahl al-Ushûl) 
and jurists agreed on four component parts 
of qiyâs, namely:
1. Original case. Its ruling stated in legal 
sources
2. New case (far’) which is not stated in 
legal sources
3. ‘Ilah (cause). It is sometimes called 
washf (quality) found in both original 
and new case.
4. Derivative law.15
Al-Jashshash, however, emphasizes that 
there is an important difference between 
two methods. For Mutakallimun, qiyas leads 
to certain knowledge while for Fuqaha’ it 
can help jurists to reach the conclusion, 
as the quality with only the most probable 
opinion (ghâlib al-zann). The distinction 
between them is due to the difference in 
the nature of the relationship between the 
‘illah and the judgment depending upon 
it.16 He clarifies further the distinction by 
arguing that for Mutakallimun the ‘illah 
and the judgment depending on it are 
so related that when the first exists, the 
13 Abu Zayd al-Dabbust, Ta’sîs al-Nazar,(Cairo: n.d,), p. 
2. Al-Karkhi’sUshûl is supplemented to Ta’sîs al-Nazar. See also, 
‘Ali Ahmad al-Nadhawi, al-Qawâ’id al-Fiqhiyyah, (Damascus: 
Dâr al-Qalam, 1986/1406 H),p. 132
14 Muh. Syawkani, Irsyâd al-Fuhul, (Dâr al-Fikr: n.d.), p. 204.
15 Muh. Syawkani, Irsyâd al-Fuhul.
16 Abû Bakr al-Jashshash, Ushûl al-Fiqh, (Cairo: Dâr al-
Kutub, n.d.), II, fol. 46v.
second will also exist with it. For Fuqaha’, 
however, the relationship concerned is 
different. That is the judicial judgment 
does not necessarily follow from the ‘illah. 
In other words, Fuqaha’ believe that a 
true judicial judgment does not need to 
follow necessarily only from a true ‘illah. 
Mutakallimun, on the other hand, declares 
that a true judicial judgment can only 
follow from a true ‘illah, for the judgment 
and ‘illah imply one another.17
Therefore, according to al-Jashshash, 
the ‘illah among the Fuqaha’ is considered 
to be conjectural. But this, as he argues, 
does not mean that someone can never 
come to true judicial judgement, although it 
is possible to hit upon the ‘illah found for 
it is false, and that also does not rule out 
the possibility of both being false. Further, 
he argues that a true judicial judgment 
with the ‘illah relating to it will also be 
true only when the ‘illah is definitely stated 
in the authoritative legal sources. But al-
Jashshash realizes that as such ‘illah found 
only in very few cases, that is explicitly 
stated and adopted in a particular case. In 
large majority of cases, however, the ‘illah 
is left to individual jurist to determine 
what it might be.18
So, what the rules used by Fuqaha.’ 
to support a certain conjectured ‘illah 
unstated in the authoritative legal sources?. 
Amir Badsyah claims that, on the whole, 
Fuqaha’ were interested in looking for some 
methodological rules that would help them 
in deciding the proper ‘illah. According 
to them, the proper ‘illah, among other 
things, should be extensible (muta’addiyah), 
through which the qiyâs is considered to 
be valid. While most Mutakalimun hold 
that by inextensible ‘illah (‘illahqashîrah) 
17 Abû Bakr al-Jashshash, Ushûl al-Fiqh, fol. 97r.
18 Abû Bakr al-Jashshash, Ushûl al-Fiqh,fols, 96v-97v.
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the qiyâs can be valid.19 The dispute 
comes, al-Sadr al-Shari’ah argues, due to 
the definition toward the ‘illah. Fuqaha’ 
define ‘illah as ta’tsîr (the effectiveness of ’ 
illah), that means that law of Allah takes 
into consideration the jins (genus) of the 
quality (jins al-washf ) or its naw’ al-washf 
(species) in the jins al-hukm (genus of 
the rule) or in its naw’ al-hukm (species 
of rule), by which the ‘illah has ability 
to produce judicial judgments other than 
stated in the legal course. Consequently, as 
he continues, if the quality is restricted to 
the text of legal source and is not found 
in another new case, the probality of the 
‘illah does not exist at all, for when the 
genus of the ‘illah or its species does not 
exist in the other case. For instance, most 
Mutakallimun of the opinion that the 
prohibition of usury in gold and silver, as 
stated in the Alquran, is by reason of their 
monetary value, and this is claimed to be 
their ‘illah. But according to Fuqaha’ such 
‘illah is not extensible to other metals.20
Here, al-Jashshash gives the example 
on this. He refers to the girl’s need to 
have her father as legal guardian before 
she marries. The Hanafis claimed that 
the reason for such guardianship is the 
girl’s immature age, while Syâfi’is thought 
it to be the girl’s virginity. For support, 
both cite certain rulings stated in the legal 
sources, as original case. But the arguments 
quoted by both opposing groups cut both 
ways. The Hanafis, however, can still claim 
that their ‘illah is better supported than 
their opponents by showingthat their ‘illah 
is effective and extensible, for it is the 
same ‘illah that produces some of rulings 
regulating the selling and buying of goods 
and properties. It is the girl’s age that 
19 Amir Badshah,Taysîr al-Tahrîr,(Cairo: Mushtafâ al-Bâbi 
al-Halabi, 1351), IV, p. 5.
20 Sadr al-Shari’ah, al-Tawdih, (Cairo: Dâr al-’Ahd al-Jadîd 
li al-Tiba’ah, 1957), II, 67.
determines whether she needs or not legal 
guardians when she sells or buys goods 
or properties. Virginity, consequently, as 
al-Jashshash argues, is irrelevant in this 
context.21
Mutakallimun, al-Sarakhsyi tells, 
however, claim that the ‘illah exists 
in the inextensible which is expressly 
mentioned in the text just as it exists in 
a parallel case which is not stated in the 
text. Therefore, according to them, the 
textual ruling is attributed to its ‘illah and 
becomes connecting link to parallel case. In 
other words, the textual ruling here stands 
originally on the ‘illah like the rule of the 
parallel case. It is clear therefore, as he says 
more, that the Mutakallimun consider the 
inextensible ‘illah as a legal cause (‘illah al-
Shar’i) analogous to rational causes (‘illah 
al-’aqli). As in the rational sciences, cause 
and effect can not be separated from each 
other, and as the existence of effect depends 
on the existence of its cause. Hence the 
qiyâs is meant originally deductive for 
individual case, not the extension to other 
cases.22
Logically, as al-Jashshash realizes, the 
separation of cause from the effect is 
not allowed in any case. But this applies 
only in the strict logical sense, that is the 
ability of rational sciences to generalize 
without exception that renders them 
totally demontrative. If it is, al-Jashshash 
argues, insisted in legal arguments will 
be misleading, for sometimes there is a 
contradiction between derivative judicial 
judgment through qiyâs with certain 
ruling in legal sources. Therefore, the 
case will be different in religious science, 
including legal discussions, which knows 
the particularization (takhshîsh al-’illah).23 
21 Al-Jashshash, Ushul al-Fiqh, fols. 96v-97r. 
22 Al-SharakhsI, Ushu1 al-Sharakhsyi, (Cairo: 1954), H, 192.
23 Al-Jashshash, Ushul al-Fiqh, fol. 97v 
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According to some jurists, istihsân 
(legally preferable) may constitute such 
particularization. The particularization in 
legal discussion is so important among 
Fuqaha’, for not always do the legal 
judgment concluded through qiyâs will 
compromise with other ruling in the legal 
sources.24 The example of istihsân by 
particularzation is given by IbnTaymiyyah.
According to qiyâs, “the produce of 
land is seized by force must belong to 
the usurper if he has cultivated the land.” 
But according to istihsân, “the produce 
must belong to the owner’s property and 
the usurper only receives a wage.” The 
‘illah in Istihsân, which particularizes the 
‘illah of qiyâs, is based on the tradition of 
Prophet, transmitted by certain Râfi’ bin 
Khadij from Prophet, which says that ‘He 
who cultivates the land of other people 
receives a wage; the crop is the property 
of the owner.25
Thus, from example above, the legal 
effect of ’ ‘illah does not always support 
the other ruling in the legal sources. Al-
Jashshash is further to say that there are 
two kinds of ‘illah, one based on fact 
(washflâzim) and other is on convention 
(washf lâ yakunlâzim). The conventional 
‘illah is based on people’s customes (‘urf/ 
‘adat al-nas), the effect of it will endure 
as long as the social convention does. On 
this perspective, the concept of urf is so 
important and becomes one of the sources 
of Islamic law in Fuqaha’s method. Al-
Jashshash gives an example and claims that 
it is true ‘illah for certain types of riba or 
unlawful gain propossed by Hanafis. Islamic 
law defines that wheat and barley are among 
24 Mushtafâ Jamâl al-Dîn, al-Qiyâs, (Najaf: Matba’ah al-
Nu’man: 1970), p. 210. 
25 Hallaq, “Considerations and Function,” p. 683, See 
also, IbnTaymiyyah, “Mas’alat al-Istihsân” in Arabic and Islamic 
Studies in Honor of H. A R. Gibb, ed. G. Makdisi, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press1965), pp, 457-458. 
the commodities in which unlawful gain 
is prohibited when they are exchanged. 
Hanafts argue that wheat and barley were 
only given as example for a certain class of 
commodities, precisely those in which the 
dry measure is used. Thus, they take the 
dry measure as the ‘illah for prohibiting 
riba in wheat and barley and extend the 
prohibition to all commodities in which 
the dry measure is used. Al-Jashshash in 
this case holds that their ‘illah is true, 
although based on convention, since the 
people has not abandoned using the dry 
measure for the commodities concerned. 
Otherwise, it will be a false ‘illah. He also 
gives the factual ‘illah, Islamic law defines 
that it is not obliged for a woman who 
is in menstruation to pray. The example 
cited is when Fatîmah bintiHubaysh told 
the Prophet that she was bleeding and 
was not sure if the bleeding was caused 
by menstruation. She then asked him if 
she should perform praying. The prophet 
told her, however, that the blood was due 
to the cut in the vein and asked her to 
perform such ritual. The cut in the vein, 
according to al-Jashshash, as true ‘illah 
that is established by the fact.26
Conclusion 
The Fuqaha’s method of legal theory is an 
attempt to harmonize between, on the one 
hand, the rulings in the Islamic legal sources 
and, on the other hand, their respect for 
solving man’s social and cultural problems 
through reasons. The attempt was primarily 
motivated by the practical aim, believing 
that the constantly emerging legal problems 
could be solved without violating the basic 
Islamic tenets. One of the important 
element for harmonizing is the ‘illah (legal 
cause), that is the link between the newly 
26 Al-Jashshash,Ushûl al-Fiqh, fols. 90r-90v and 103r. 
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introduced judicial judgment and those 
stated in the authoritative legal sources 
(qiyâs). ‘Illah, according to Fuqaha’, should 
be extensible (muta’addiyah), and as ta’tsîr 
(the effectiveness of ’ ‘illah) that are to 
make judicial judgments more extensble 
and applicable.
Mutakallimun, on the other hand, treat 
the ‘illah as the link that relates respectively 
to the conclusion and premises of rational 
sciences. Furthermore, the Mutakallimun’s 
method of legal theory mostly relates to 
theoritical doctrines which hardly use the 
judgment of practical application of theory 
to furû’. This can be seen from the general 
outlines of works on Ushûl al-Fiqh. Most 
of them deal with the problems that do 
not properly belong to Ushûl al-Fiqh, such 
as theology. Therefore, it is not surprising 
when modern scholars of Islam, such as 
Louay Safi who, after viewing the various 
methods; from the method of textual 
analysis to of logical analysis until the 
science and the problematic of metaphysical 
knowledge, concludes, among other things, 
that Muslims’ legal methods do not pay 
adequate attention to the development of 
methods geared towards understanding social 
phenomenon, but more focus on method 
of textual analysis and systematization of 
textual inference rather than systematically 
develope scientific methods and procedures. 
Unfortunately, his conclusion is not entirely 
true since the Fuqaha.’s method has not 
been properly consulted.
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